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BIANNUAL SURVEY

treatment as may be of importance to him without having to
wade through matter that does not particularly affect his practice.
2- LImiTATIoNs OF TImE
Continuous trespass: Statute of limitations defense disallowed.
In 506 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,'
a trespass action to recover damages, the defendant pleaded the
statute of limitations 2 as a defense. The court of appeals held
that an underground encroachment built in 1939 was a continuing
trespass, and although the right to bring an action accrued in 1939,
the three-year statute of limitations did not bar institution of
the suit in 1960.
The court distinguished a permanent trespass, which gives rise
to a single cause of action, from a continuous trespass. "In New
York, we have consistently characterized an unlawful encroachment
as a continuous trespass giving rise to successive causes of action.
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The court reasoned that although the structure itself was

permanent, the trespass was continuous. Apparently, the court
considered that to allow defendant to successfully plead the statute
of limitations would, in effect, allow adverse possession without
notice thereof to the owner.
Periodic payments under an allegedly void lease do not constitute
separate wrongs for statute of limitations purposes.
Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc.4 was a stockholders' derivative suit based on an allegation that a lease entered
into between the corporation and a principal stockholder was
either void or voidable because of excessive rental charges. Defendants contended that since the lease was entered into nine years
prior to the inception of the action, the statute of limitations 5
was a bar. Plaintiffs countered that each payment under the lease
was a separate, continuous wrong, and that they were thus entitled
to damages which accrued during the most recent statutory period.
The court rejected the theory "that each payment pursuant to a
wrongful agreement gives rise to a separate and distinct claim ...
The settled rule ...

is that the statute of limitations begins to run

upon commission of the overt act causing damage."

6

" 15 N.Y.2d 48, 203 N.E2d 486, 255 N.Y.S2d 89 (1964).
2CPA § 49(7).

3506 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y2d
48, 52, 203 N.E.2d 486, 488, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92- (1964).
4235 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

5The court made no determination as to which statute of limitations
was applicable, as it concluded that plaintiff would have been barred under
the most favorable statute.
'Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).

